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Abstract—Integrated circuits (ICs) are the foundation of all
computing systems. They comprise high-value hardware in-
tellectual property (IP) that are at risk of piracy, reverse-
engineering, and modifications while making their way through
the geographically-distributed IC supply chain. On the frontier
of hardware security are various design-for-trust techniques that
claim to protect designs from untrusted entities across the design
flow. Logic locking is one technique that promises protection
from the gamut of threats in IC manufacturing. In this work,
we perform a critical review of logic locking techniques in the
literature, and expose several shortcomings. Taking inspiration
from other cybersecurity competitions, we devise a community-
led benchmarking exercise to address the evaluation deficiencies.
In reflecting on this process, we shed new light on deficiencies in
evaluation of logic locking and reveal important future directions.
The lessons learned can guide future endeavors in other areas of
hardware security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Hardware Security: Mitigating Threats to the Supply Chain
Integrated circuits (ICs) are the foundation of all computing
systems, and the need for security spans the entire system life-
cycle, from conception, through hardware design and manu-
facture, and across the system’s operating lifetime. Hardware
Intellectual Property (IP) protection is crucial, especially as
the market for domain-specific computer hardware becomes
more lucrative [1]. Given the high-value effort involved in
hardware design, we want to prevent IP theft, counterfeiting,
malicious modifications, and reverse-engineering. Effective
security techniques for use in the IC supply chain are of the
utmost importance for mitigating such threats.
The IC supply chain is geographically distributed and in-
volves potentially untrusted parties that expose IP to piracy
threats [18], [19]. Potential adversaries in the design flow
include System-on-Chip (SoC) integrators, foundries, test fa-
cilities, and end-users, as shown in Fig. 1. Throughout the
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SELECTED DESIGN-FOR-TRUST TECHNIQUES [2]. 3
MEANS A TECHNIQUE CAN PREVENT PIRACY BY THE UNTRUSTED ENTITY.
Untrusted Entity
Design-for-Trust Technique SoCIntegrator Foundry
Test
Facility
End
User
Watermarking [3] 7 7 7 7
Camouflaging [4]–[6] 7 7 7 3
Split manufacturing [7], [8] 7 3 7 7
Metering (passive) [9], [10] 7 7 3 3
Logic locking [11]–[17] 3 3 3 3
design flow, there are opportunities for overbuilding, reverse-
engineering, and hardware Trojan insertion [20]. Researchers
have proposed various digital circuit “Design-for-Trust” tech-
niques, including watermarking [3], camouflaging [4]–[6],
split manufacturing [7], [8], passive metering [9], [10], and
logic locking [11], [17], [21]–[24], as shown in Table I.
We focus in this work on logic locking as a promising and
versatile approach for protecting IP against various threats in
the supply chain; it has gained traction in the wider hardware
design academic community (reflected in the trajectory of
publications in Fig. 2). Logic locking is an active, decade-
old research area [25], with numerous proposals (e.g., [11],
[17], [21]–[24]) and subsequent attacks (e.g., [13], [26]–[31]).
Given logic locking’s status as a frontier of hardware security,
this paper contributes: (i) a critique on logic locking evaluation
in the literature, (ii) community-driven benchmarking to pro-
vide a “snapshot” of the current field, and (iii) broader lessons
for hardware security benchmarking. This work systematizes
an important area of IC supply chain security, and as other
hardware security techniques approach maturity, these experi-
ences offer useful insights for future benchmarking efforts.
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Fig. 1. The IC design flow: this involves a geographically distributed supply chain with numerous untrusted parties.
B. What is Logic Locking?
Broadly, IP usurpers want to take a design and use it
illegitimately. As illustrated in Fig. 1, digital designs un-
dergo a series of processes. Within a design house, designers
integrate various IPs to satisfy a system specification; this
design undergoes logic synthesis to produce a netlist. The
netlist is transformed through physical synthesis to produce
a layout that can be fabricated by a foundry, producing the
IC. After manufacture, the ICs are sent to a test facility for
testing and packaging, before being returned to the design
house. Logic locking protects a design by inserting additional
logic into it; the added logic “locks” the design such that a
locked circuit, without the correct key, behaves erroneously.
To protect combinational circuits, logic locking transforms the
output into a function of the primary and the key inputs. To
protect sequential circuits, logic locking inserts states and state
transitions, expanding the reachable state space to include non-
functional states. The netlist is locked in the design house
before being sent to the other parties in the design flow; the
locked IC is activated by the design house before distribution
to end-users. Logic locking aims to mitigate several threats:
• An untrusted foundry or an end-user may reverse engineer
and pirate IP by extracting a netlist from the physical IC
or layout. Without the key, an attacker cannot produce a
design that is functionally equivalent to the original.
• A malicious foundry may overbuild surplus ICs and sell
them in grey markets at lower prices. However, without the
secret key, the foundry cannot unlock the extra ICs.
• Hardware Trojans are malicious alterations to a design.
A logic locked IC can prevent insertion of Trojans. The
key gates alter the transition probabilities of the signals in
a circuit in a manner unknown to the attacker, making it
harder for them to identify stealthy locations for Trojans.
• Logic locking can hamper counterfeiting and cloning, as
they rely on reverse engineering [19].
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Fig. 2. Publications in logic locking over the years.
C. What is the current landscape in logic locking research?
While logic locking is touted by academic proponents as
a promising defense against IP piracy, reverse-engineering,
and hardware Trojan insertion [32], the community at-large
continues to contribute numerous back-and-forth exchanges,
extolling the latest triumphs against attacks or proclaiming
the “end of logic locking” [33], [34]. Throughout the recent,
formative years of logic locking research, various independent
research groups have investigated the effectiveness of attacks
and defenses alike. This raises a natural question: What is the
current landscape in logic locking research? To answer this
question, we systematize the literature and identify several
shortcomings in how logic locking techniques have been
evaluated. As we will explain in Section II, these include:
• Reliance on “best-effort” re-implementation of techniques
• Inconsistent locking parameters for comparisons
• Variations in comparison criteria (e.g., allowed attack time)
• Inconsistent benchmark selection
• Limited benchmark complexity
• Disagreement over “in-scope” security guarantees
Motivated to overcome these deficiencies, we sought inspira-
tion from cybersecurity contests across software and hardware
domains [35]–[41] as a means to synthesize community in-
sights into hardware security. We highlight examples of such
contests in Table II, where the exercises brought together the
community to explore new approaches, benchmark techniques,
and systematize knowledge. Besides synthesizing insights
from the literature, we embarked on the first community-wide
benchmarking of logic locking. This took the form of a red-
team/blue-team “competition” with a common framework for
evaluating the locking techniques and the efficacy of attacks
on logic locking. By bringing together leading research groups
with interested experts from government agencies and the
private sector, this effort aimed to build a capability towards
something akin to a NIST-style contest (e.g., post-quantum
cryptography process [35]).
Contributions. From the combined efforts of the commu-
nity, this study offers new insights for evaluating hardware
security techniques. The contributions include:
• A critical analysis of the evaluation of attacks and defenses
in the literature.
• Community-guided insights into threat models and attacker
capabilities addressed by logic locking.
• Results from red-team/blue-team benchmarking. For the first
time, red teams could launch attacks on a common set of
benchmarks, allowing a fairer comparison of their efficacy
and a measure of the resilience of the blue teams’ defenses.
• Insights and reflection on the overall benchmarking process,
including open questions and opportunities for investigation.
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TABLE II
SELECTED COMMUNITY COMPETITIONS IN CYBERSECURITY-RELATED DOMAINS. FOR “OPEN SOURCE”: # INDICATES THAT THE CONTEST
INVOLVED/EXPECTED ATTACKS AND DEFENSES TO BE OPEN SOURCED,  INDICATES THAT THERE WAS NO EXPECTATION FOR EITHER ATTACK OR
DEFENSE TO BE OPEN, H# INDICATES THAT THE ATTACK ARTIFACTS WERE OPEN-SOURCE BUT NOT THE DEFENSE
Competition
(First year) Organizer
Open
Source Domain Aims Participants Contributions
Crypto standards
(e.g., AES, PQC)
(1997)
NIST # Crypto Standardize cryptoalgorithms ≥ 300
Participants submit candidates for evaluation. Community contributes to
minimum requirements, submission requirements, evaluation [35] using open
comment threads and workshops
CTF (1996) Academia+
Govt.
 Software Vulnerabilitydiscovery and
exploitation
≥ 10,000
annually
Contestants identify and exploit system vulnerabilities. These contests are
offered as professional development opportunities, community-building
exercises, and product security evaluation [36]
Rode0day (2018) Academia+
Govt.
H# Software Automated BinaryBug Detection ∼ 28 teams Monthly “buggy binary” released. Participants aim to discover vulnerabilities.Bug injection is automated using an open-source tool [37]
Cyber Grand
Challenge (2014) DARPA # Software
Autonomous software
vulnerability detection
and patching
∼ 200
Participants develop and test autonomous systems to identify vulnerabilities
and develop patches for unknown software [38]. The organizers prepared the
challenge sets with vulnerabilities for the competitors’ automated tools to
analyze and repair. Tools generated proof of vulnerabilities and deployed
them against competing tools.
CSAW-ESC
(2008) Academia # Hardware Hardware security ≥ 300 Contest spanning numerous domains, including hardware Trojan design,detection [39], yielding the hardware Trojan corpus [42]
Hack@DAC
(2017) Academia+Industry
H# Hardware Hardware BugDetection (CTF-style) ≥ 150
Participants identify bugs in an SoC. They score points by submitting bug
reports identifying the root cause, a test for confirming the issue, severity
assessment, and exploit code. They may submit tools for automatic bug
detection. Offers insights into the challenges for manual/automated bug
detection in hardware flows [40]
DPA Contest
(2008) Academia # Hardware/Crypto Side-channelresistance ≥ 30
Compare side-channel techniques (attacks, acquisition techniques,
counter-measures). Participants develop attacks and defenses, organizers
prepare benchmarks and draw insights into sample acquisition challenges [41]
This work (2019) Academia  Hardware Logic LockingEvaluation ∼ 40 Evaluate state-of-the-art combinational and sequential logic locking againstnumerous attacks to draw insights from participants’ experiences
D. Paper Organization
In Section II, we outline the broad aims of logic locking
and present our critical analysis of the logic locking literature.
In Section III, we address recently proposed invasive attacks
on logic locking. Following this, we discuss our benchmarking
effort, discussing the threat model and assumptions on attacker
capabilities in Section IV. In Section V, we provide brief
technical background on the combinational and sequential
locking techniques and then present the findings from the
benchmarking effort in Section VI, where we outline the
various attack approaches and the achieved attack results.
In Section VII, we reflect on our efforts, examining lessons
learned. Finally, we present our perspectives on the future of
logic locking and its evaluation, concluding in Section VIII.
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE
A. Background: Motivations for Logic Locking
Motivation for logic locking was first presented in [11], [21],
where the primary issue is that of integrated circuit (IC) or
intellectual property (IP) piracy. In this scenario, a malicious
party steals designs so that they can produce or distribute them
for their own benefit. As such, the main objective of [11]
is to discourage “unauthorized excess production and stolen
masks” by making it difficult to reverse-engineer or modify a
functional IC. This motivation has since inspired the research
community, giving rise to threat models for both combinational
and sequential circuit locking research. The intended users of
logic locking include semiconductor IP designers and system
integrators who want to protect high-value designs from theft
and manipulation by untrusted foundries and from the threat
of reverse-engineering.
B. Logic Locking Evaluation in the Literature
Table III presents an overview of work in combinational
locking, highlighting techniques and settings used by authors
in evaluating their locking techniques or attack approaches.
We invite interested readers to examine [25] or [50] for a
thorough survey of the history of logic locking and related
fields. While we do not present sequential approaches here,
readers can observe similar ad hoc and disparate evaluations
in the literature.
In the initial proposals for logic locking, starting with
Random Logic Locking (RLL), as part of EPIC [21], tech-
niques are evaluated on generally informal, qualitative criteria,
based on novel aspects, such as number of test patterns for
sensitizing primary outputs to key inputs [13]. The formulation
of a boolean Satisfiability (SAT)-based attack [26] provided a
watershed moment—not only did they present an attack that
was able to “defeat” existing logic locking techniques, they
also provided a freely usable attack/defense implementation.
Spurred by the SAT-based attack, new SAT- resistant tech-
niques have proliferated, each applied to varying subsets of
ISCAS ’85 circuits [51] and circuits sourced from other
benchmarks (such as MCNC [52], OpenSPARC [53], and
ITC ’99 [54]). Different works chose different subsets (often
with overlaps), but with different re-implementations of prior
techniques, with different settings. For example, the choice of
“how much locking” when preparing benchmarks for evaluat-
ing techniques varied across works; in some papers, e.g., [15],
[46], [47] choose a 5% area overhead for guiding locking
evaluation—others, such as [16], simply picked a key size
(such as 128 bits). Following the dissemination of [26], the
number of key bits that were successfully retrieved (in a given
time) became frequent evaluation criteria for defenses, result-
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TABLE III
NON-EXHAUSTIVE OVERVIEW OF DEFENSE/ATTACK SELF-EVALUATION: CIRCUITS USED, TECHNIQUES (RE-)IMPLEMENTED, AND EVALUATION DESIGN
Year Technique
Evaluation Circuits
(number in chosen subset)
(Re-)implemented
Locking/ Attacks Notes on Evaluation Design (e.g., key sizes)
2008 RLL [21] ISCAS85 (2) – / – Informal/Qualitative security analysis focusing on the key distribution aspects
C
om
bi
na
tio
na
l
L
oc
ki
ng
Te
ch
ni
qu
es
2012 FLL [12] ISCAS85 (10) – / – Informal/Qualitative security analysis
2012 SLL [13] ISCAS85 (9) RLL
Brute-force analysis, key gate-type analysis, # of test pattern analysis, informal
analysis
2016 SARLock [14] ISCAS85 (4), OpenSPARC (7) RLL, SLL / SAT Start of the “post-SAT” techniques, applies SAT from [26], 10–64 key-bits
2016 Anti-SAT [15] ISCAS85 (3), MCNC (3) SLL / SAT SAT from [26] with 10 hr timeout, 43–364 key bits, SLL based on 5% area overhead
2017 TTLock [23] ISCAS89 (5) – / SAT, Sensitization 16–18 key bits, used SAT [26], 48 hr timeout
2017 Cyclic [43] ISCAS85 (9), MCNC (7)
RLL (for area
comparison only) / – 72 key-bits to compare overhead, no empirical attack evaluation
2017
SFLL-HD/
SFLL-flex [16]
ISCAS89 (3), ITC99 (7),
ARM Cortex-M0
FLL / SAT, Anti-SAT,
2-DIP, Sensitization
48 hour timeout for SAT, 11–14 key-bits for initial evaluation, 128 key-bits of SFLL
and 128 key-bits of FLL for case study on ARM Cortex-M0
2018 SFLL-fault [44] ITC99 (6) – / SAT 128 key-bits, 48 hour timeout. Claims the same as SFLL-flex
2019 SFLL-rem [17]
ITC99 (6), DARPA CEP SoC,
ARM Cortex-M0
– / SAT, FALL 80 key-bits, evaluated using open-source implementations from [26] and [45], 524key-bits for SoC case study
2012 Sensitization [13] ISCAS85 (10) RLL, FLL / – Brute-force analysis, key gate-type analysis, # of test pattern analysis
A
tta
ck
s
on
C
om
bi
na
tio
na
l
L
oc
ki
ng
2015 SAT [26] ISCAS85 (11), MCNC (12) RLL, FLL / Sensitization
Released a SAT-based attack tool and tool for applying RLL, FLL, and SLL, set 10
hour timeout. Locking based on 10–50% overhead.
2017 SPS [46]
ISCAS85 (8) and OpenSPARC
(7) FLL, Anti-SAT / SAT
Compares SAT attack to SPS, 64 & 256 Anti-SAT key-bits + FLL based on 5% area
overhead
2017 AGR [47]
ISCAS85 (10), ISCAS99 (2)
OpenSPARC (7), MCNC (3)
FLL, Anti-SAT,
SARLock / SPS, AppSAT 512 Anti-SAT key-bits + FLL based on 5% overhead
2017 Bypass [48]
ISCAS85 (6), MCNC (1),
EPFL (1)
RLL, SARLock,
Anti-SAT
Informal comparison of attack with SAT and Removal on different techniques,
mentions SLL but implements RLL for SARLock+SLL
2017 AppSAT [27] ISCAS85 (20), MCNC (6) Anti-SAT, RLL / – 16–30 Anti-SAT key-bits + 30–80 RLL key-bits
2017 2-DIP [29] MCNC (11) SARLock, [32] / SAT
8–256 SARLock key-bits with 27–1682 [32] key-bits, representing 5–25% area
overhead
2017 CycSAT [30] ISCAS85 (9), MCNC (12)
[32] using [26], Cyclic /
SAT
71–90 key-bits, uses [32] based on 10% area overhead, 53–837 key-bits total;
illustrates shortcoming of [26], [43] as a result of specific SAT-attack implementation
2019 Redundancy [31] ISCAS85 (10) RLL, Sensitization / – Oracle-less individual and pair-wise analysis based on 5% area overhead
2019
Unit
Function [49] ISCAS85 (4), ITC99 (6) RLL / – Oracle-less self-referencing search of equivalent unit functions for 128 key bits
2019 FALL [45] ISCAS85 (9), MCNC (11) TTLock, SFLL-HD / – SFLL-HD
0, SFLL-HDh with 10–128 key-bits, 1000 sec. timeout
ing in various time limits for running attacks, ranging from
seconds (set in [45]) to days (set in [44]). From examining the
variability in evaluation design, several questions arise about
the present state of logic locking attack/defense evaluation:
• What is the right key size?
• Are oft-used benchmarks (like ISCAS) representative of
“typical” IPs that logic locking might protect?
• What is a reasonable attack timeout?
• What are “realistic” capabilities of attackers? (we examine
this more specifically in Section III)
The answers to these questions differ across studies, which
brings to question the generalizability of claims about whether
locking is “provably secure” [16], will “most likely never suc-
ceed” [33], or somewhere in-between. We take this uncertainty
as an opportunity for a coordinated evaluation.
What is the right key size? Various papers set the
“amount” of locking using some holistic measure—usually as
part of some security/power/performance/area trade-off (e.g.,
locking based on 5% overhead as in [47]). In other works,
key size is often set independently of the target circuit char-
acteristics, (e.g., in [45], where key size is set to a maximum
128 bits). When key size is set by researchers for their attack
evaluations, it is hard to know if the re-implementation settings
are aligned with defense designers’ intentions. Furthermore,
while there may be some overlap between the circuits used
for evaluation, there is not always a 1:1 correspondence, which
makes comparisons somewhat inconclusive.
Are ISCAS ’85 benchmarks enough? The most-used
benchmark circuits come from the ISCAS ’85 collection [51],
featuring circuits from about 6 to 3000 gates with dozens
to hundreds of inputs and outputs. Even where ISCAS ’85
circuits are used, the selection of circuits within the benchmark
set varies from work to work. In addition, these designs are
small compared to “realistic” designs, such as the IPs used
in SoCs (e.g., in [17], the IPs are around 16∼156K gates,
orders of magnitude larger than the ISCAS ’85 circuits). As
the ISCAS ’85 circuits are not necessarily representative of
the scale of complex modern IPs that will benefit from logic
locking techniques, whether the claims about the scalability
of locking (and corresponding attacks) hold for “realistic” sce-
narios requires further examination. While not yet widespread,
recent works [17], [55] have started using realistic SoCs, such
as the Common Evaluation Platform [56] which has a UCB
Rocket-Chip and integrated DES3, GPS, MD5, RSA, SHA256,
DFT, IDFT, and IIR cores connected by a AXI4-Lite bus.
What is a reasonable attack time out? Similar to the
variability in key size and circuit selection, quantifying attack
resilience/efficacy also varies from study to study. The commu-
nity is evaluating security by determining what is “practical”,
at least empirically. In some locking technique studies, authors
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aim for resilience to the SAT-based attack [26] (e.g., [15],
[23]) as measured by whether the SAT-based attack times out
by taking longer than a pre-specified bound. As attack time is
influenced by many factors such as the circuit complexity and
key sizes and not determined solely by the attack algorithms,
another criterion may be complexity in terms of the number
of iterations needed to recover a key. There are no guarantees
that the underlying execution platform resources are consistent
across evaluations, and no contextualization/justification as
to what constitutes a “reasonable” amount of time that a
dedicated attacker would be willing to devote before an attack
becomes uneconomical. Another missing piece of the puzzle is
whether “attack time” should consider the wider effort required
of an attacker; for example, should the time taken to setup
tools, understand the benchmark formats, and so forth, be a
factor in a holistic evaluation?
C. Shortcomings in Evaluations: A Critical View
As evident in recent work, there is a lack of agreement
with respect to metrics for the trade-off between security
and overhead [55], [57]. As such, there are shortcomings in
the framing, analysis, and evaluation of attacks and defenses,
including:
Relying on “best-effort” re-implementation of tech-
niques. Evaluation of attack and defense techniques are some-
what ad hoc in the literature; independent groups typically
select what they find to be the state-of-the-art attack/defense
techniques, applying them on relatively small scale designs
(either bespoke, or drawn from benchmarks designed for other
purposes). Due to a lack of coordination or implementation
availability, the techniques are often re-implemented from
(often incomplete) descriptions found in literature.
This reduces transparency of the evaluation process. While
techniques are somewhat scrutinized (and there is a case to
be made on the merits of replicability), there are potential
biases at play (for example, choice of circuits and key sizes)
and limitations on the quality of the (re-)implementations
used to compare techniques. Furthermore, only some logic
locking attack and defense implementations are open-sourced.
To improve attacks and defenses, attackers need feedback on
how well their techniques break locking, and defenders need
feedback on how well their techniques perform under scrutiny.
Inconsistency in setting parameters for comparisons.
In addition to the re-implementation of techniques, attack
and defense techniques feature several parameters. These
include which combination of techniques to apply, the number
of key bits, which attack techniques to compare with, and
attack time-out limits. Given the wide variety of settings,
direct comparisons between different techniques are difficult to
make, so conclusions related to relative performance/overhead
impacts vs. attack success, etc. do not necessarily provide
clear guidance to practitioners as to appropriate key sizes
or security/overhead trade-offs. Moreover, different attacks
are performed with varying computational resources, from
student desktop-class machines through to university high-
performance clusters, further complicating direct comparisons.
Variations in comparison criteria. When comparing lock-
ing and attacking techniques, researchers use numerous cri-
teria to compare their works to prior art. These include
area overhead, performance impact, and resilience against a
chosen attack (e.g., measured as time taken to perform a SAT-
based attack [26], or a specific implementation of a SAT-
based attack). On this front, individual contributions to the
literature are somewhat scattershot: some works might trade-
off area overhead against number of SAT-based iterations,
whereas others might use analytic measures (e.g., theoretical
corruptibility). Different groups choose different evaluation
criteria, while making broader claims about scalability, attack
resiliency, or attack effectiveness against types of defenses.
As observed in [55], there are no unified metrics in terms of
circuit size, SAT-attack execution time, or technology libraries.
Limited benchmarks. As mentioned earlier, numerous
works use a limited set of evaluation circuits, typically drawn
from the ISCAS ’85 benchmarks [51], ITC ’99 set [54] and
the MCNC (ACM/SIGDA) benchmark suite [52]. While they
may not match the complexities of IPs in modern systems-on-
chip (SoCs), they provide valuable insight into how locking
techniques change logical structure and affect overhead. Nev-
ertheless, they may miss important issues/flaws that can arise
when applying logic locking to large modern designs. While
these oft-used benchmarks provide some commonality across
works in the literature, they provide limited range in terms
of reflecting different applications and use cases, especially
as the community moves forward towards developing more
useful and robust techniques.
Furthermore, with respect to emulating attack scenarios,
the use of known benchmarks provides advantages to an
attacker (beyond the scope of the threat model). Additionally,
ISCAS and ITC benchmarks were developed by the IC test
community for evaluating automatic test pattern generation
(ATPG) coverage. Other research communities, such as those
working on hardware security, have adopted these benchmarks.
Crucially, for logic locking, these benchmarks do not have
verification testbenches to prove that locked circuits behave
identically to original circuits or that a key has correctly been
applied. Another practical issue is that these benchmarks are
often in BENCH format (from the ISCAS benchmarks [51]),
which is not easily compatible with several EDA tools.
Limited resources for coordinating. Aside from the ef-
fort we present in this paper, there have not been many
opportunities for a red team/blue team style evaluation of
attacks and defenses, where an impartial party facilitates the
interaction between participants and allows organized sharing
of resources (e.g., benchmark circuits and external judging).
Without this coordination, the barrier of entry into the logic
locking attack/defense domain can be prohibitively high, as
teams need to prepare both attack techniques and evaluation
artifacts. Running an exercise that frees teams from the need to
re-implement allows attackers and defenders to focus on their
techniques; this also enables a controlled and fair comparison
across techniques (and their implementations).
Disagreement over “in-scope” security guarantees. There
are myriad threat models that aim to be addressed by myr-
iad defense techniques. In the existing literature, defender
goals (when proposing a locking mechanism) and attacker
points-of-view (in terms of what constitutes the “breaking”
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of a technique) do not always align. For example, the work
in [17] assumes an attacker that can reverse-engineer a netlist
from a physical layout (e.g., GDSII files) and also acquire
a working chip (e.g., from the “open-market”), setting aside
invasive attacks as orthogonal (and addressed by advances in
physical, package-level countermeasures). In contrast, recent
critiques of logic locking [33], [34] propose invasive attacks,
such as optical probing. Such attacks do not identify weak-
nesses in the fundamental strength of the proposed locking
techniques, but instead target the underlying implementation
technologies—these vulnerabilities can be addressed with suit-
able technology-based solutions that build on top of logic
locking in a defense-in-depth approach [58]. We discuss more
challenges to invasive attacks in Section III.
D. Informing our Benchmarking Exercise
Given the plethora of evaluation settings, we were motivated
to bring the community for a coordinated benchmarking effort.
In other words, the aim of this benchmarking exercise was to
provide a level playing field for comparing different attacks
against locking techniques, allowing teams to field their “best
efforts” by studying a common set of circuits within a common
time-frame. Our benchmarking exercise was thus designed to
address these shortcomings in the current landscape by:
• agreeing on a threat model for the benchmarking exercise
(see Section IV);
• setting common goals to compare attack techniques (i.e.,
key recovery, see Section IV);
• preparing a shared benchmark suite with clearly defined
locking parameters (see Section V);
• focusing on larger, realistic benchmarks (see Section V);
• empowering the teams to focus on their attacks/defenses,
without fretting about re-implementing others’ works (see
Section VI); and
• coordinating the community’s effort (see Section VI).
III. ON INVASIVE ATTACKS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In [33] and [34], authors proposed new threat models based
on the availability of advanced probing techniques such as e-
beam [59] and laser probing [60], [61] that were developed for
IC failure localization analysis. Although spontaneous light
emission techniques [62], [63] were not mentioned in [33],
[34], they have also successfully been used to probe internal
IC nodes. These probing tools were originally invented and de-
veloped for IC failure analysis and chip characterization [60],
[63]. Typically, they are used for defect localization through
global inspection (using light emission maps and electro-
optical frequency mapping) and then local probing of the
specific nodes. Usually these techniques are time-consuming
and require preliminary electrical test and diagnostics aimed
to narrow down the probing areas.
These tools have been expanded and used for hardware
security by developing automated data collection, image pro-
cessing, and information extraction [62], [64]. Some appli-
cations include identifying functional blocks and detecting
Trojans [62], and reading the contents of 14 nm SRAM [64].
Fundamentally, there are two issues when attackers want
to use optical probing techniques for observing the key gate
signals or key latches/flip-flops. One is the limitation of spatial
resolution, and the other is identifying the probing location.
As the technology evolves to 7 nm and below, it becomes very
difficult for any non-invasive optical probing tool to be able
to see individual gates, even using Solid Immersion Lenses
(SILs) [65]. The optical spatial resolution of a state-of-the-art
probing tool equipped with SIL is about 200 nm which can be
calculated using the Rayleigh criterion R=0.61λ/NA, where λ
is the light wavelength (e.g., 1064 nm or 1340 nm for com-
monly available probing lasers), and NA is the SIL numerical
aperture (e.g., ∼3). The same principle can be applied to the
resolution of transistors that emit light emissions when they are
powered up or switching. These emissions are broadband and
reach a peak around 1.8 m for new technology nodes [66].
Therefore, using light emission for probing also suffers of
resolution issues. However, even with these limitations and
challenges, light emission can be used to detect some types of
Trojans [62] due to advances in image processing and analysis
techniques. This is because the physical size of Trojans is large
enough so that optical probing can identify additional circuitry
compared to the original design.
For extracting the logic locking key, however, one needs
to identify the gates used in locking—this is much smaller
compared to hardware Trojans. In [34], a 28 nm FPGA was
used to demonstrate that the key values can be extracted using
laser probing. Although this proof-of-concept example shows
the success of laser probing, it will suffer when measuring
random logics manufactured in the latest technology node. The
diffraction limitation fundamentally defines the resolution of
optical probing, as mentioned earlier. For scaled nodes, the
electro-optical spots are often a cluster of many gates and it
is very hard or impossible to interpret them. It is even harder
to derive the logic key values from these spots. For random
logic, designers can intentionally hide the key gates using a
more compact layout. From the semiconductor process side,
designers can choose heavily doped silicon wafer so that the
near infrared light is absorbed by the silicon. This makes it
hard to see through the backside. Therefore, key bits can be
hidden without using design tricks as an anti-tamper feature.
Localizing the region of the chip containing the locking
logic is another challenge. In contrast to regular chip diag-
nostics where test engineers have some targeted test patterns
and responses to guide where to probe, designers of locked
circuits could make a design where keys are hard to find
by probing. Although recent works [33], [34] assume that a
malicious foundry can reverse engineer the IP core from the
GDSII file and identify the key gates and registers, it is in fact
a challenge to localize them, in particular for random logic.
Together with the limits of spatial resolution at the advanced
nodes, it is challenging to reveal the key bits using probing.
Fundamentally, the goal of logic locking is to protect IP
during manufacture. Protecting IP after manufacture and
during use is the province of anti-tamper technologies. Both
technologies must be used in a coordinated fashion to protect
a chip throughout its life cycle. Ideally they would be com-
plementary approaches that make both the locking and the
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anti-tamper stronger than they would be in isolation. This is
a promising area for further study.
IV. BENCHMARKING: THREAT MODEL AND GOALS
A. Wider Attacker Motivations
Following our critical examination of the literature, we now
turn our attention to benchmarking. In discussing any potential
security problem, it is important to characterize potential
attackers’ motivations, targets, and capabilities. Rajendran et
al. first described the potential threat posed by an attacker
that can (1) reverse-engineer a locked netlist, and (2) access
a functional, unlocked design (i.e., acquired from the open
market) [13]. Access to a reverse-engineered netlist enables
attackers to perform structural analysis of sequential [22] and
combinational circuits [13]. With an unlocked netlist, attackers
have an oracle, giving rise to query-based attacks, such as
those that cast unlocking as a Boolean satisfiability (SAT)
problem, e.g., as originally formulated by Subramanyan et
al. [26]. This threat has oft-appeared in the literature, where it
is posited that malicious designers, in a chip fabrication plant,
are well-positioned to reverse-engineer the GDSII file of a
design to obtain the locked netlist, and malicious end-users or
IC testers are well-positioned to access a functional, unlocked
chip [17]. Attackers that conspire and coordinate between
these pre- and post-fabrication threat actors thus represent a
plausible “worst-case” most-capable attack scenario that logic
locking techniques seek to address.
B. Benchmarking Threat Model and Attacker Goals
Using this threat of colluding malicious actors in the design
flow as our starting point, red and blue teams discussed various
challenge goals focused on unlocking the correct functionality
of a locked design, i.e., working towards functional equiv-
alence between an unlocked design and the corresponding
attacker-recovered design. Our discussions worked towards
deciding what would be considered “in-scope” for our initial
benchmarking effort. As evident in the literature, this aim
is framed as a problem of determining the secret key (or
unlocking key sequence in sequential locking), as the recovery
of the key entails full recovery of a locked IC’s functionality.
In combinational locking, we also considered the possibility
of approximate functionality recovery—i.e., we discussed if a
“partially” successful attack is meaningful, where an attacker
only recovers a subset of the key or produces an approximately
functional circuit. A “partially unlocked” circuit would pro-
duce input/output functionality that matches some, but not all,
of those from the original design. The utility of a partially
unlocked circuit depends on the application context: a circuit
that has a low error rate, relative to the complete input/output
space, could constitute a successful attack; in another case,
perhaps with regards to mission critical designs, no error is
tolerable at all. Alternatively, it may be the case that no
error in a user-defined input/output subset is allowed in the
partially unlocked circuit—whether or not the attacker has
prior knowledge of the targeted design and its use depends
on the broader context, such as the availability of collateral
(e.g., datasheets, whitepapers, or patents).
The benchmarking coalesced around the essential threat that
logic locking thwarts, i.e., embracing the key-centric model.
The red teams set out to recover the secret key, with or without
oracle access. As we re-iterate in Section VII, partially un-
locked circuits are useful in some contexts obviating recovery
of the full key.
C. Benchmarking Scope
In the wider context of electronic design reverse-
engineering, real-world attackers need to perform various tasks
to recover knowledge about a design, depending on the design
artifacts they are able to retrieve. For example, attackers need
to re-produce the netlist; given a netlist, an attacker might
first need to perform a functional analysis to identify the
components-of-interest in the design [67]. Given a manufac-
tured IC, attackers first need to depackage, delayer, and carry
out some form of imaging/microscopy to ascertain the circuit
structure [68], after which the netlist can be recovered for
further analysis. Attackers may want to gain information from
probing devices and measuring side-channels (such as power
or EM emissions). These techniques are by no means trivial,
and represent a significant level of investment by them.
As logic locking provides one security modality among
many possible complementary defenses, we focused the scope
of our benchmarking effort to the evaluation of logic locking
techniques themselves, setting aside the “upstream” challenges
for recovering the netlist to begin with. To that end, we
assumed that a correct, locked netlist is available to the
attacker, and that, where we make available an oracle, barriers
to acquiring an unlocked working device are non-existent.
V. BENCHMARKING: OVERVIEW AND PREPARATION
A. Participants and Timeline
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Fig. 3. Timeline of the Benchmarking Process
The benchmarking involved over 40 experts registered in
18 teams from 14 affiliations in the USA and India. The
teams comprised experts in VLSI test, hardware security,
and academics working at the forefront of combinational
and sequential logic locking research. Additionally, we in-
vited seven external judges from industry and government
agencies alongside some industry observers. They interacted
with/quizzed the participants at the finals event, where the
attack teams presented their approaches and outcomes.
The benchmarking effort involved two rounds, as illustrated
in Fig. 3. The qualifying round lasted ∼1.5 months. The red
teams attacked the locked designs created by the blue teams
while maintaining a live journal on their attack methods and
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4. (a) Original IP (b) Locked IP with two randomly inserted key gates.
the tools used. At the end of this round, the red teams submit-
ted preliminary results (i.e., key bits and/or input sequences)
for feedback. Red teams with promising approaches were
down-selected as finalists. The finals round lasted ∼1 month
and involved further attack work, culminating in the delivery of
a final report, poster, and in-person presentation to the judging
panel. During the challenge, we invited teams to reach out to
the blue teams as required (via the challenge coordinators) for
clarification or technical support. There were no restrictions
on the red teams with respect to compute resources or tools1.
B. Benchmark Preparation
Participants focused on combinational and sequential lock-
ing separately, with two expert blue teams preparing respec-
tive sets of locked designs. Red teams had the freedom to
choose which class and size of circuits to attack. This section
describes the locking techniques selected for evaluation and
provides details on the size/complexity of the locked designs.
The details are provided from the perspective of the blue teams
for combinational (Team X) and sequential locking (Team Y).
1) Combinational Locking Overview: In combinational
locking, the design IP is locked with key inputs by inserting
some logic gates; without the correct value provided at these
key inputs, the design IP will produce incorrect outputs and fail
to work. The correct key value is kept secret from untrusted
entities. Fig. 4 shows an example logic locking implementation
using random logic locking (RLL) [21] which adds “key gates”
throughout a design to corrupt the output with incorrect key
inputs. In this benchmarking, Team X adopts two techniques
in tandem: Stripped Functionality Logic Locking (SFLL-
rem) [17] and RLL [21]. The attackers need to circumvent
both layers of defense to break the overall defense.
The first logic locking scheme is designed to mitigate the
threat of SAT attack; details of the inner workings of SFLL-
rem are available in [17]. SFLL-rem uses point-functions to
increase the effort of the SAT attack by eliminating one key
in each iteration out of a possible 2N keys, where N is the
number of bits in the key. Although it is SAT attack resistant,
this defense is vulnerable to approximate attacks.
To thwart approximate attacks [27], [29], the benchmarks
implement RLL [21] on top of SFLL-rem to increase the out-
put corruption when an incorrect key is used (i.e., to produce
incorrect functionality for a partially recovered (approximate)
1a tacit expectation was that the teams did not subvert the spirit of the
competition by reverse-engineering the oracle (executables).
TABLE IV
COMBINATIONAL CIRCUIT BENCHMARKS. SMALL BENCHMARKS ARE
LOCKED WITH A 40-BIT RLL KEY AND 40-BIT SFLL-REM KEY. MEDIUM
BENCHMARKS ARE LOCKED WITH A 60-BIT RLL KEY AND 60-BIT
SFLL-REM KEY. LARGE BENCHMARKS ARE LOCKED WITH 80-BIT RLL
KEY AND 80-BIT SFLL-REM KEY. THE BONUS CIRCUIT WAS LOCKED
WITH 128-BIT RLL KEY AND 128-BIT SFLL-REM KEY.
Competition benchmark # Inputs # Outputs # Gates
small (derived from b20 C) 522 512 20226
medium (derived from b22 C) 767 757 29951
large (derived from b17 C) 1452 1445 32326
bonus (Cortex-M0) 892 1746 16164
key). RLL randomly inserts key gates into the netlist which
may or may not at times provide 50% output corruption. More
sophisticated techniques such as fault-analysis based logic
locking (FLL) [12] and strong logic locking (SLL) [13] can
be used to complement SFLL.
2) Combinational Locking Benchmark Preparation: Team
X applied SFLL-rem + RLL to 7 different circuits comprising
two variants per reference design (i.e., one provided with an
oracle, the other without) derived from academic benchmark
circuits (taken from ITC ’99 benchmark suite), and a locked
Cortex-M0 microprocessor (as a bonus challenge). The circuits
are named small, medium, and large, based on relative gate
counts and listed in Table IV. The team chose key sizes for
each of the small, medium, large, and bonus circuits, according
to their gate count. For the small, medium, and large circuits,
we choose 40, 60, and 80 bits of security, respectively, in
part to make the competition approachable. The bonus circuit,
however, is locked with 128-bit security.
The combinational locking process involves three steps:
1) Remove all traces of the benchmark identity. The modifi-
cations prevent recovery of the functionality by comparing
the circuit against public benchmarks2.
a) Change gate types of randomly selected gates.
b) Rename internal nets by converting circuit to AND-
Inverter gate (AIG) format.
c) Rename I/O ports.
2) Lock modified circuit with SFLL-rem.
3) Lock SFLL-rem locked circuit with RLL.
Team X verified the unlocking of the design using an open
source equivalence checker [26]; it requires the locked netlist,
the original netlist, and the key value. To prepare an oracle for
the locked circuits, Team X converted the modified benchfile
to executable permitting access to I/Os and not the internal
circuitry. This mimics access to a working chip obtained from
the market. Since the competition does not provide the original
netlist, the red teams cannot use equivalence checks to verify
their key bits. Hence, the red teams report back to the blue
team (via the organizers) who confirm how many of the key
bits recovered are correct.
3) Sequential Locking Overview: Team Y uses an improved
variant of state space obfuscation [22] for sequential locking.
Since the correct operation of any IP depends on the control
logic (i.e., a function of inputs and control states embedded
in a finite state machine (FSM) into the design) the sequential
2Cadence LEC can provide a patch file to recover original functionality.
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TABLE V
STATISTICS OF THE SEQUENTIAL CIRCUIT BENCHMARKS
Attack
Model
Competition
Benchmark
Academic
Benchmark
No. of
Inputs
No. of
Outputs
Length of
Key
Sequence
Warm-
up Tiny Custom 6 71 18
With
Oracle
Small i2c 18 14 51
Medium md5 41 35 63
Large s35932 36 32 134
Without
Oracle
Small s15850 13 87 52
Medium s13207 11 121 103
Large uart 21 13 162
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Fig. 5. (a) Original state machine (b) Locked state machine with added state
register (increasing number of reachable states from three to eight)
locking defense involves expanding the functional state space
by inserting additional state registers into the FSM. The added
and the existing state registers form a combined FSM which
dictates the normal or locked operating mode of the design.
To enable the normal mode of operation, an authorized user
needs to apply a sequence of unlocking key inputs through the
design’s primary inputs. This causes the extended state ma-
chine to traverse along a specific “unlocking” state sequence.
Without the correct key sequence, the locked design will re-
main in, and transition between, a set of non-functional states,
producing non-functional (i.e., corrupted) outputs. Thus, to
enable the normal operation mode, an attacker would:
1) Find the inserted state registers used in locking,
2) Find the unlocking key sequence, and
3) Extract the functional states from the locked design.
The locking mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 5. To enable the
normal operation, the green path must be traversed by applying
a sequence of key inputs K1, K2, and K3 where each of the
key inputs can comprise varying subsets of the primary inputs.
If an incorrect key input is applied, the red path is traversed
and the normal mode is never reached. As the IP is in the
locked mode, it remains non-functional. Unlike combinational
locking, sequential locking re-uses primary inputs as key
inputs. Based on the constraints and level of the security, the
key width and the length of the key sequence is altered.
4) Sequential Locking Benchmark Preparation: Each de-
sign is locked using different lengths of key sequence as shown
in Table V. To lock a design, extra state registers are inserted to
increase the reachable state space of the design. The expanded
state space overlaps with the existing state space; the state
transition function of the existing state machine is modified to
use the additional states available from the extra state registers,
including the addition of the unlocking input sequence. The
number of gates, the number of inputs/outputs and the number
of state registers in the design determine the complexity of
locking and difficulty of unlocking.
The locked designs are synthesized using LEDA 250nm
technology node. Team Y renamed the wires and cells to
prevent attackers from isolating the obfuscation logic by
looking at the names. However, primary input/output names
were kept as is. The attackers are given white-box access
to the locked netlists, i.e., they have access to the inputs,
outputs, and individual cells of the design. For oracle-less
attacks, the attackers were given the locked netlist. For oracle-
based attacks, a locked netlist and the original netlist (i.e., the
design before locking) were provided. To verify the results,
the attacker can simulate the locked design by applying the
key sequence, followed by a random pattern. The output is
compared to the output of the oracle for the same input.
VI. BENCHMARKING RESULTS
A. Results Overview
We present the finalists’ attack results on combinational and
sequential locking in Table VI and Table VII, respectively.
In the combinational locking attacks, several teams recovered
all RLL key bits. Each table presents the teams, their attack
approach and their chosen attack scenario (oracle or oracle-
less). This is followed by attack success on the various
benchmarks represented by the number of key bits recovered.
Red teams reported that their attacks recovered a number of
key bits. The blue team checked to see how many matched
up. We present the result as “x/y”, i.e., the number of bits, x,
verified as correct, out of the bits recovered by the attacker, y.
No team was able to recover the complete set of SFLL keys.
In the attacks on sequential locking, none of the teams
reported an entirely correct sequence and set of key input
ports. One attack recovered a subset of the key input ports
used for key assertion—in Table VII, this is represented as
“a/b”, where a out of the b input ports used as key inputs
were correctly identified. The attack attempted to identify the
key sequence; this is reported as “c/d” where c is the sequence
length recovered by the attack, while d is the actual length.
B. Outline of Attack Approaches
The red teams proposed interesting attack directions, in
some cases incorporating those proposed in the literature.
None of the attacks were able to successfully recover the entire
key. In this section, we outline the attack attempts and their
success. The appendix presents more detail on the attacks.
• ATPG-based (Oracle-guided) Team A applied the sensi-
tization attack [13] on combinational locking. While the
team identified the primary inputs connected to the key
inputs, they failed to recover the SFLL-rem key. Overall,
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TABLE VI
COMBINATIONAL LOCKING ATTACK RESULTS.
Benchmark
Team Approach Attack Scenario Small (40+40) Medium (60+60) Large (80+80) Bonus (128+128)RLL SFLL RLL SFLL RLL SFLL RLL SFLL
A Key Sensitization Oracle 40/40 - 60/60 - 80/80 - - -
B Hamming Distance-based Attack Oracle 30/30 - 50/50 - 72/72 - - -
C Automated Analysis + SAT Oracle 11/18 - 31/50 - 10/34 - - -
D Sub-circuit SAT Oracle 17/17 - 29/29 - - - - -
E Redundancy-based Oracle-less 28/28 4/12 35/35 23/28 45/45 0/51 66/66 8/27
F Bit-flipping Attack Oracle 40/40 - 60/60 - 80/80 - - -
G Topology guided attack Oracle-less 15/32 - 19/50 - 36/73 - 75/108 -
TABLE VII
SEQUENTIAL LOCKING ATTACK RESULTS.
Small Medium Large
Team
# input ports
used for key
assertion
Length of key
sequence (#
clock cycles)
# input ports
used for key
assertion
Length of key
sequence (#
clock cycles)
# input ports
used for key
assertion
Length of key
sequence (#
clock cycles)
Attack Scenario
A 5/10 10/52 4/5 12/103 4/19 11/162 Oracle-free-/5 -/63 5/16 10/51 4/26 10/134 Oracle
they recovered 100% of the RLL key bits and none for SFLL-
rem. The team also used an ATPG-based method to attack
sequential locking based upon [69], but this did not correctly
recover the key sequence.
• Hamming Distance (HD)-based Attack (Oracle-guided)
Team B proposed a divide-and-conquer approach to attack
the combinational locking. To attack SFLL-rem, they pick
the protected input patterns (PIP) one at a time and apply
the SAT attack. This team was able only to recover most of
the RLL key bits and none of the SFLL-rem key bits.
• Automated SAT (Oracle-guided) Team C attempted a
divide-and-conquer approach by dividing the circuit into
smaller logic cones, starting with primary outputs and
performing a SAT attack on the smaller cones, focusing on
cones with fewer key inputs. The team recovered fewer than
50% of RLL key bits and no SFLL-rem key bits.
• Sub-circuit SAT (Oracle-guided) Team D proposed a SAT
attack on combinational locking by simplifying the circuit
using two strategies and then applying SAT attack. First,
they find an output which depends on one key input. Second,
they find a key input which propagates to one output only.
They recovered fewer than 50% of the correct RLL keys and
none of the SFLL-rem key bits.
• Circuit Redundancy (Oracle-less) Team E centered their
attack on circuit redundancy [31] by observing that a
post-synthesis insertion of key gates yields invalid design
alternatives that do not adhere to well-established design
characteristics, specifically the redundancy level, thus giving
away the incorrect key bit values. The team recovered more
than 50% of RLL key bits, all correctly. They recovered fewer
than 50% of the SFLL-rem key bits.
• Bit-flipping attack (Oracle-guided) Team F devised an
attack on the combinational locking using bit flipping [28].
This attack recovered all RLL key bits in under a minute for
the largest benchmark and none of the SFLL-rem key bits.
• Unit Function Search Attack (Oracle-less) Team G at-
tempted the Unit Function search attack on the combina-
tional locking [49]. If one or more key gates are placed
in an instance of repeated unit function (UF) during the
locking of a circuit, the original netlist can be recovered
by searching the equivalent unit functions (EUFs) with all
hypothesis keys. This attack recovered fewer than 50% of
RLL key bits, and no SFLL-rem key bits.
VII. REFLECTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Following the benchmarking effort, we reflected on the un-
dertaking and solicited feedback from participants and judges.
This section describes observations and insights we drew
from examining the competition submissions and continuing
discussions amongst the coordinators, red-team and blue-team
participants, judges, and external observers.
A. Observations and lessons for logic locking
Important Findings for Logic Locking. Table VIII sum-
marizes the findings from the benchmarking process. SAT
attacks remain a popular element of the attacks on SFLL-
rem + RLL, but requires oracle access. Exploration on oracle-
free approaches is an open challenge. State space obfuscation
presents interesting challenges for attackers, especially without
access to a scan-chain; attackers need to decide how much
to unroll a design to perform analysis. Sequential locking is
less familiar to the community and hence is less mature and
will benefit from wider dissemination. As it stands, SFLL-
rem and State Obfuscation remain “unbroken” based on this
benchmarking effort, with the fielded attacks offering only
partial “success” in key recovery.
On Participant Prior Experience. Most participants in the
benchmarking exercise were experienced researchers in VLSI
testing, hardware security, and specifically logic locking. Sev-
eral teams featured members with a mix of background famil-
iarity, where undergraduates worked with doctoral candidates
that had published works on attacks/defenses in logic locking.
In the qualifying round, some teams comprised students who
were introduced to the concepts of logic locking in class a few
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TABLE VIII
IMPORTANT FINDINGS (SAT: SATISFIABILITY SOLVER; ATPG: AUTOMATIC TEST PATTERN GENERATION).
Locking Technique On SAT-based Attacks On ATPG-based Attacks On Structural Analysis Important Takeaways
SFLL-rem + RLL
(Combinational)
Remains the
technique-of-choice for
attacking LL. Successful
in attacking RLL.
Emerging attack
formulation, showing
some promise even
without oracle access
Crucial for attacking
locked designs in a more
scalable, piece-wise
manner
Most attempted attacks require oracle
access; the potential for oracle-free
approaches require further exploration.
RLL can be attacked successfully while
SFLL-rem remains resilient to attack
State Space
Obfuscation
(Sequential)
Not attempted, requires
scan access or
appropriately unrolled
design
Also requires unrolling,
but # of cycles to unroll
is exponential in number
of flip-flops and initial
(reset) state
Important to find the
added state registers
Not yet as mature/familiar as
combinational locking, perhaps requiring
further dissemination for a more thorough
evaluation.
weeks before the contest. Furthermore, most teams concerned
themselves with combinational locking only—suggesting that
sequential locking is less familiar.
On Tools Used. Participants described a number of different
tools used to perform attacks on the benchmark circuits. These
include various SAT solvers, ATALANTA ATPG tool [70], and
a lot of scripting (typically in languages like Python or Perl).
Many teams automated netlist parsing and analysis, although
some teams started with a level of manual inspection.
B. Reflections on the benchmarking process
On Logistics and Communication. Throughout the bench-
marking process, the coordinators acted as intermediaries
between red teams and blue teams, and were keeping all
people in the loop. The primary medium for communication
was e-mail; participants were invited to maintain a live report
to detail their efforts throughout the exercise, although these
were often left untouched until the hours before the deadline.
Ensuring that e-mails were received and noted is particularly
challenging, although perhaps understandable given that par-
ticipants may have had numerous competing concerns (i.e.,
as graduate students, many participants had coursework and
other academic pursuits with respect to the academic calendar).
Maintaining interest and incentivizing participation are diffi-
cult challenges; we tackled this by being in frequent contact
with the red teams, blue teams and the judges3.
On Benchmark Management. There were a number of
challenges in terms of benchmark preparation, including how
best to prepare and validate the benchmark circuits, and
subsequently, how to distribute them. In our benchmarking
effort, we relied on good-faith, best-effort practices from the
blue teams. The blue teams independently prepared bench-
marks and accompanying support material (e.g., oracles) after
consultations with the community. Once the benchmarking
commenced, the coordinator facilitated communication be-
tween red teams and blue teams, accommodating requests
where reasonable (for example, recompilation of oracles for
different execution platforms). While this approach worked
well, future iterations will benefit by additional documentation
and vetting of the benchmark circuit preparation process
by parties external to the blue teams. Furthermore, future
iterations could adopt standard formats for benchmarks (e.g.,
3We offered a funded trip to the in-person finals for the student finalists as
additional motivation.
netlists in Verilog or VHDL) synthesized with an open-source
technology library, for better tool interoperability.
On Result Assessment/Verification. Red teams submitted
their attack outputs to the coordinator; these were then passed
on to the blue teams for correctness assessment. While this
process works in terms of assessing key recovery success, our
benchmarking effort was not able to evaluate other metrics;
while the scalability of an attack can be somewhat inferred
by considering which of the benchmarks were attacked, other
dimensions like attack implementation runtime or space com-
plexity were not measurable (i.e., we did not offer a common
computation platform). In some ways, we can interpret the
results of this effort as a rough measure of what an attacker
might be able to achieve end-to-end within ∼3 months, albeit
with several caveats (e.g., teams were not working exclusively
on the problem during the competition).
On Resources. The predilection towards combinational
locking suggests that there is less familiarity with sequential
locking in the community (at least, as represented by the par-
ticipants). This raises a bigger question about what sort of re-
sources and documentation could be provided to participants in
future iterations to reduce any barriers to entry (and hopefully,
encouraging more robust evaluation of the locking techniques).
It would also be interesting to investigate what additional
collateral material might support further evaluations of logic
locking in “real-world” scenarios. For example, datasheets or
other design documents as “plausible” supporting information
that is accessible to an attacker; access to such information
might enable a thorough examination of logic locking.
C. Perspectives on Application-level Directions
While the red/blue team exercise was underway, we sup-
ported an orthogonal exploration by Team Z. This team pro-
posed an alternative attacker model that provides a promising
new direction for logic locking research. Their approach aimed
to quantify application-level ramifications of logic locking,
considering each locked benchmark netlist as a small part of
a larger and more complex system with a specific application.
Because logic locking impacts the IC as a whole, application-
level considerations provide important context for both combi-
national and sequential locking. With this context, architectural
factors, such as error tolerance, and application-level factors,
such as workload characteristics, must now be considered. This
presents a holistic view of logic locking in practice.
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To explore this attacker model, Team Z proposed a custom
logic locking simulation framework, ObfusGEM. ObfusGEM
integrates logic locked netlists within a cycle-accurate GEM5
model of a processor [71]. By running arbitrary workloads
on this model and tracking the divergence between a locked
and unlocked processor, the application-level impact of logic
locking is quantified [72]. This provides a promising avenue
to evaluate logic locking moving forward.
During this benchmarking, Team Z used ObfusGEM to
integrate custom, small netlists, locked with SFLL-rem, into
an x86 processor IC. Using this model, they showed that
approximate keys, sufficient for the correct execution of a
variety of software benchmarks, could be located, despite
the presence of incorrectly keyed logic locking. While the
locked netlists were of a smaller scale compared to the
main benchmarking exercise, these results point at application-
level context as a potential new direction for both attack
and defense research, including hardware/software co-design
and high-level synthesis, that can leverage application-level
considerations to strengthen the security of logic locking.
Thus, in future evaluations, the community should examine
application-level considerations and the context they provide
for combinational and sequential logic locking.
Several teams were able to recover the RLL keys for the
combinational locking benchmarks, arguing that the remaining
key inputs could be set randomly to retrieve an approximate
circuit, with low error rate. This points to a well-known aspect
of SFLL-based locking, where output corruption is limited
to combat oracle-guided attacks. However, implications of
an approximately recovered circuit is application dependent.
Since different input/output pairs may have different levels
of “importance” depending on the context, generalizing that
the recovery of a circuit with a low error rate constitutes a
successful attack may not be appropriate. How best to reflect
application-level concerns in the next iteration is a direction
to pursue.
D. Broader Reflections for Hardware Security
As mentioned in Section I, logic locking is one of sev-
eral design-for-trust techniques. The lessons from our critical
examination of the literature and benchmarking approach
provide insights into the challenges faced in hardware security
generally, and may in turn inform future efforts in evaluating
alternative, emerging techniques in this area.
As we discussed in Section II, selecting appropriate bench-
marks is crucial for characterizing techniques (e.g., with re-
spect to overheads) and providing context for how effective an
attack/defense is. In hardware security, more broadly, procur-
ing benchmarks is not trivial. Unlike software, where there
is ample (and production-quality) open-source resources, the
hardware design community is not as populous (for example,
there are ≥200K active Java projects on GitHub [73], whereas
OpenCores contains ∼1K hardware IP-blocks [74]).
Having access to open-source tools might help with bench-
mark creation and evaluation. However, while open-source
academic tools for hardware design exist (e.g., ABC [75] for
logic synthesis), industrial electronic design automation (EDA)
tools are less accessible, and this may preclude fully open-
source logic locking tool-chains. Having said that, efforts such
as OpenROAD [76], whose goal is an open-source RTL-to-
GDSII flow, may change the future prospects.
Another area for future efforts include greater industry
involvement, notwithstanding possibly complex legal IP is-
sues or non-disclosure agreements, etc. For instance, the
Hack@DAC [40] organizers were able to find a way for
industry engineers to contribute meaningful hardware bugs
to an open-sourced SoC design. While not security related,
the long running ICCAD CAD contests [77] have shown
success in bringing industry and academia together, such as
the industry-provided benchmarks for physical design in [78].
How best to pursue this for design-for-trust techniques gen-
erally is an open question. Further, incorporating application-
related context will be useful (e.g., identifying and quanti-
fying important inputs and outputs). Industry could propose
different benchmarks for characterizing different facets of the
techniques, perhaps locking for datapaths, locking for sea-of-
gates, or locking for SRAMs.
Our work has demonstrated the value of coordinated evalu-
ation of hardware security techniques. With industry, govern-
ment, and academic support, logic locking and other hardware
security techniques can benefit from formal and ongoing
evaluation. By making these processes regular and structured,
researchers could submit new techniques on an ongoing ba-
sis for rigorous assessment. Such a process would increase
confidence in hardware security technologies.
VIII. FUTURE OUTLOOK
Next Steps for Benchmarking. There are a number of
areas that future iterations of community benchmarking can
include for greater insights into the usability, practicality, and
resilience of logic locking techniques. These include: (1) a
common (possibly cloud-based) platform for comparing attack
techniques: having a standard computing platform for launch-
ing attacks will allow better side-by-side comparisons of attack
strategies with respect to their execution times, scalability,
etc., (2) an even wider variety of benchmark circuits, possibly
grouped by application domains (with this additional context
provided to or withheld from the red teams depending on the
threat model to be emulated), and (3) varying the amount of
information provided to the attacker (e.g., application context).
In our benchmarking exercise, we treated the combinational
and sequential locking techniques in isolation—in the next
iteration, it could be worth expanding the fielded defenses
as well as investigate if we can gain more from combining
techniques. The SFLL-rem technique was combined with
RLL and the RLL-keys were broken. Perhaps other locking
approaches can be mixed-in successfully.
Open-sourcing and Support Materials. For deeper
scrutiny and wider adoption of logic locking, the natural
next step will be fully open-source implementations of the
locking techniques with detailed support materials (algorithm
descriptions, user guides, etc.). This may pave the way for
standardization, modeled after the NIST-style processes where
the community-at-large publicly dissects the algorithm and its
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(reference) implementation. Increasing the visibility into the
inner workings of locking techniques will increase confidence
in correctness, and move the needle even closer towards
Kerckhoff’s principle in favor of security by obscurity. This is
a challenge as locking techniques may use commercial tools
as part of the tool flow. License costs may be prohibitive to
some and non-disclosure agreements may hold back others.
Open Questions. While this paper explored shortcomings
of the evaluation in the logic locking literature and attempted
to address these through our foray in benchmarking, more
open questions remain. These include ongoing questions about
what constitutes a successful attack, i.e., how can we formalize
meaningful notions of approximate recovery or application-
level concerns? More work could also look to separating
analysis of a locking technique from attacks that arise from
a flawed implementation of the technique. Furthermore, is it
possible to definitively conclude that a defensive technique has
“graduated” from this process? This will inform the steps that
could be taken after a technique succeeds at this process, in
terms of potential impacts on wider adoption or public policy.
Concluding Remarks. In this paper, we prepared, ran, and
reflected on the first benchmarking effort in logic locking.
Through this process we worked towards leveling the playing
field where defenders and attackers were given the opportunity
to “put their best foot forward”. As it stands, SFLL-rem
and State-based locking remain “unbroken” based on this
benchmarking effort, with the fielded attacks offering only
partial success. Our efforts produced a timely snapshot of the
current state-of-the-art in logic locking for digital design IP
protection. As these techniques mature and new attacks and
defenses emerge, the lessons learned from this community
effort will provide a foundation for future endeavors.
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APPENDIX
While some red teams proposed new attacks, others used
attacks published in the literature. None of the attacks suc-
cessfully recovered the entire key. This section provides further
details on the attack attempts (in no specific order).
ATPG-based (Oracle-guided) Team A applied the sensitiza-
tion attack [13] on the combinational locking benchmarks. In
this attack, automatic test pattern generator (ATPG)4 is used
to detect a fault at a key input, with the other keys tied to a
don’t-care. If a test pattern is found, this indicates that there
is a path from the key input to a primary output that does not
require setting the other keys. The test pattern is applied to the
oracle to propagate the value of the key input to the primary
output. To recover the SFLL-rem key bits, a different approach
based on fault equivalence and dominance was attempted. This
attack looks for a fault that is equivalent or dominant to the
fault that was removed. While the team identified the primary
inputs connected to the key inputs, they failed to recover the
SFLL-rem key. They recover 100% of RLL key bits and none
of the SFLL-rem key bits.
The team used an ATPG-based method to attack the sequen-
tial locking benchmarks, based upon [69]. To attack a locked
sequential circuit, the ATPG-based attack unrolled the circuit
(as scan-chain access was not provided). Unrolling a sequential
circuit increases the attack complexity exponentially and this
4ATPG is used to test circuits to detect manufacture-time faults such as a
wire stuck-at-zero and stuck-at-one.
complexity increases with the number of registers. In order
to deploy a successful attack, the circuit needs to be fully
unrolled. The team incorrectly guessed the number of cycles
to unroll to be 5 cycles. This led to an incomplete unrolling
and a failure to recover the complete key.
Hamming Distance (HD)-based Attack (Oracle-guided)
Team B proposed a divide-and-conquer approach to attack the
combinational locking. There are three steps to perform this
attack: identify the type of key inputs, strip partial RLL key
inputs, and launch the attack.
1) Split the locked netlist into individual logic cones (ILCs).
2) Count the number of key bits in each cone to identify the
type of protection for each ILC and the type of each key
input. Since they find all ILCs and each cone’s protection
type, they can find the RLL key value.
3) Select all RLL cones and merge them into a netlist with
fewer primary outputs (compared to the full netlist). The
SAT attack on this netlist returns a valid RLL key with
partial RLL key inputs. Applying this key to the original
locked netlist produces a simplified locked circuit.
To attack the SFLL-rem lock, they pick one cone which is
only protected by SFLL, as shown in Algorithm 1. First, they
extract the functionality stripped circuit (FSC) from the locked
cone. From this they collect a set of candidate protected input
patterns (PIPs) whose Hamming distances are no greater than
a threshold d to at least one PI in the FSC’s reduced PI table.
The PIP candidates are fed into the oracle and the FSC to
identify differences in the output, thus verifying that the input
pattern is indeed protected. If they can find one verified PIP,
they use this PIP as the first input pattern into the SAT-based
attack and find the correct key from the attack. This key is
valid for other locked cones. This team recovered most of the
RLL key bits and none of the SFLL-rem key bits.
Algorithm 1 Hamming Distance (HD)-based Attack
Require: A SFLL-fault cone Clocked, oracle O, parameter d
Ensure: Correct key keyc
1: CFSC ← extract FSC(Clocked)
2: Reduced PIT ← extract PI table(CFSC)
3: PIPcand ← {p|HD(p, pi) ≤ d,∃pi ∈ Reduced PIT}
4: for p ∈ PIPcand do
5: if O(p) 6= CFSC(p) then
6: keyc ← SAT simulation(Clocked,O, p)
7: return keyc
8: end if
9: end for
Automated SAT Attack (Oracle-guided) Team C attempted
a divide-and-conquer approach by dividing the circuit into
smaller logic cones, starting with primary outputs and iden-
tifying the fan-in logic. The team automated this structural-
level analysis and performed a SAT attack on the logic cones,
focusing on those cones with fewer key inputs. The circuit is
divided into individual logic cones. An analysis of the cones
reveals that some outputs depend on only one key input and
a relatively small number of inputs. As an intermediate step,
they attempted to find DIPs on a small logic cone with one
key input, 33 primary inputs, and one primary output. The
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Algorithm 2 Bit-flipping Attack
Require: Encrypted circuit C(X, K, Y) and oracle eval.
Ensure: Encryption key Kc.
1: i = 1
2: F1 = C(X,K1, Y1) ∧ C(X,K2, Y2)
3: Fixing SFLL-rem keys in K1 and K2 to a random value
4: while sat[Fi ∧ (Y1 6= Y2)] do
5: Xi = sat assignmentX(Fi ∧ (Y1 6= Y2))
6: Yi = eval(Xi)
7: Fi+1 = Fi ∧ C(Xi,K1, Yi) ∧ C(Xi,K2, Yi)
8: i = i+ 1
9: end while
10: Kc = sat assignmentK1(Fi)
SAT solver was unable to solve the reduced circuit, so a key
sensitization attack on the smaller logic cone was performed.
This attack chooses an arbitrary set of inputs, executes the
oracle, collects the targeted output, and runs the SAT solver
with the key input as the unknown. The SAT solver produced
an output for the single unknown value. After finding some
keys from logic cones with a single key input, the team
targeted logic cones with increasing numbers of key inputs
and one unknown key input. The team recovered <50% of
RLL key bits and no SFLL-rem key bits.
Sub-circuit SAT Attack (Oracle-guided) Team D launched
a SAT attack on combinational locking. They used two strate-
gies to find a sub-circuit on which to apply SAT attack.
1) They find an output which depends on one key input. Then,
the SAT attack is applied for the sub-circuit. If the SAT
solver iterates twice to find the value of a key, it indicates
that this value is correct.
2) They uncover a key input which propagates to only one
output. A SAT attack is mounted on the sub-circuit involv-
ing the cone of influence of this output. The resulting key
is correct as it depends only on that output and this value
can be used to find additional key inputs recursively.
They recovered <50% of the RLL key bits and none of the
SFLL-rem key bits.
Redundancy attack (Oracle-less) Team E used the redun-
dancy attack [31] on the combinational locking benchmarks.
The attack is based on the observation that key gates modifies
the netlist after synthesis and therefore produce arbitrary
invalid design options that fail to adhere to certain design
principles such as redundancy removal. The attack dismantles
the complexity of the key space by deciphering key bits
individually or in pairs. Since RLL key bits are inserted in
the middle of the netlist, they have stronger local impacts
on the redundancy level of nearby regions where a single
modification to the intertwined re-convergent structures alone
results in untestable faults. On the other hand, incorrect key
values for SFLL result in untestable faults at the convergence
point of the functionality stripped circuit and recovery unit.
The removal of such redundant faults would make certain
output bits completely unprotected by SFLL, thus proving the
invalidity of the key assignment. The team recovered >50%
of RLL key bits and <50% of the SFLL-rem key bits.
Bit-Flipping Attack (Oracle-guided) Team F adopted the
bit-flipping attack [28] on the combinational locking bench-
marks based on. The key bits of RLL and SFLL-rem are
separated by fixing the key values to random values with the
Hamming distance equal to one, and counting the number of
Distinguishing Input Patterns (DIPs). DIPs are used to differ-
entiate between the design outputs when different key values
are applied. Since the error rate of SFLL-rem is exponentially
low, the protected input patterns are rarely applied even if
the SFLL-rem key is wrong. Thus, they randomly fix the
SFLL-rem key and solve the RLL key by applying the SAT
attack [26]. This attack recovers all the RLL key bits in under
a minute for the largest benchmark. Algorithm 2 shows the
methodology. They recovered all RLL key bits and none of the
SFLL-rem key bits.
Unit Function Search Attack (Oracle-less attack) Team G
mounted the Unit Function Search attack on the combinational
locking benchmarks [49]. If one or more key gates are placed
in an instance of repeated unit function (UF) during the
locking of a circuit, the original netlist can be recovered
by searching the equivalent unit functions (EUFs) with all
hypothesis keys. The hypothesis key bit will be the actual
secret key bit if a match is found. The attack fails when the
search fails to find a match with all hypothesis keys.
This attack uses an efficient depth-first search to find the
EUFs in a locked netlist. Searching the EUFs in the netlist is
equivalent to the subgraph isomorphism problem. Hence, they
convert the netlist to a directed graph, where each gate in the
netlist is a vertex, and each wire is an edge. For each EUF,
the search algorithm traverses the generated graph to check
for the existence of the same structure.
Since each key bit is targeted individually, the average time
to determine a secret key bit is in the order of seconds. The
initial version of this attack in [49] targeted RLL presented
in [11], where there is no inter-dependency among key bits.
This attack recovered <50% of RLL key bits, and no SFLL-rem
key bits.
